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Abstract 
 
Government spending has significant environmental implications. This paper analyzes the effect 
of the allocation of government spending between public goods broadly defined and private 
goods or non-social subsidies on air and water pollution. The theoretical model predicts that a 
reallocation of expenditures from private subsidies to public goods improves environmental 
quality by reducing production pollution. We estimate an empirical model that shows that such a 
reallocation causes a significant reduction in air pollutants namely sulfur dioxide and lead and an 
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1. Introduction 
This article investigates the impact of the composition of government expenditures between 
public goods, broadly defined, and private goods or non-social subsidies on environmental 
quality. We develop a model to illustrate the relationship between government spending 
allocation and the environment and then empirically analyze how the composition of government 
spending affects air and water pollution. The key distinction between “public goods” and 
“private goods” expenditures is that the former alleviates the negative effects of market failure, 
while the latter does not. We broadly define public goods to include subsidies to households 
(education, health and other social transfers), expenditures in conventional public goods, 
environmental protection, research and development (R&D), and knowledge diffusion. 
Government spending in private goods involves direct and indirect government subsidies to 
firms other than subsidies directly for R&D and environment protection. 
Spending in the household sector, mainly through social transfers, education, and health care, 
tends to alleviate credit market failures which constrain investment in human capital. This may 
ameliorate the tendency to under-invest in education and other forms of knowledge by 
households.
1 Other distortions that may be alleviated by spending in public goods include 
common market failures such as environmental externalities, externalities associated with the 
generation and diffusion of knowledge and the under provision of “pure” public goods in a 
market.  
In contrast, government-provided private goods such as credit subsidies, energy and other input 
subsidies, farm programs, government grants to corporations, financial bailouts, and other 
financial subsidies targeting specific industries or even individual firms often exacerbate the 
                                                 
1 Credit market failures are prevalent in both developed and developing economies. Grant (2007), for example, 
shows that about one third of US households face binding credit constraints.   3
distortions caused by market failure. Government expenditures in private goods tend to substitute 
rather than complement private investments. Studies have shown that at best these private 
subsidies are ineffective at promoting private investment.
2 In addition, expenditures in private 
goods crowd out spending in public goods given a fiscal budget.    
Another distinction between private and public goods is that the former are much more affected 
by lobbying than the latter (López and Islam, 2008).  Apart from causing efficiency losses, the 
influence of the lobby groups tends to affect the distribution of expenditures in private goods in 
favor of a small number of wealthy individuals or firms.  One consequence of the lobbying 
process is that expenditures in private goods usually promote capital intensive economic sectors, 
which have the greatest capacity to effectively lobby governments, as opposed to service sectors 
which tend to be human capital-intensive. Expenditures in public goods not only disperse more 
evenly across households, thus allowing human capital investments by credit-constrained poor 
households, but also tend to promote more human capital-intensive activities which are generally 
less environmentally demanding.   
The reallocation of government spending towards public goods may affect pollution via the 
proximate factors identified in the literature: scale, composition, income, technique, and growth 
effects (Antweiler et. al. 2001). As shown by López and Islam (2008), restructuring government 
expenditures in favor of public goods causes more economic growth inducing a scale effect 
which, ceteris paribus, increases environmental pressures. On the other hand, such a reallocation 
of government spending for favors human capital intensive activities as opposed to physical 
capital intensive activities. To the extent that human capital intensive activities tend to be 
                                                 
2 Examples include Bregman, Fuss, and Regev (1999) for Israel, Fakin (1995) for Poland, Lee (1996) for Korea, 
Bergstrom (1998) for Sweden, Estache and Gaspar (1995) for Brazil, Harris (1991) for Ireland   4
environmentally cleaner than the physical capital intensive activities, a reallocation from private 
to public goods causes a composition effect that is pro-environment. 
The technique effect could also be pro-environment to the extent that more public goods 
provisions is associated with more R&D and technological diffusion which could also directly or 
indirectly cause the development and implementation of cleaner technologies. The technique 
effect is not necessarily related to income growth on a one-to-one basis as assumed by the 
literature (Antweiler, et al. 2001).  In fact, the literature often refers to the technique “or” income 
effect as if they were the same thing. While it is true that sometimes income growth may trigger 
technique effects, this is not always the case as shown by (López, 2008). Neither is it true that 
the only source of the technique effect is income growth. We show below that a technique effect 
can arise from the restructuring of government expenditures, even if we control for per capita 
income growth.
3   
We hypothesize that the reallocation of government expenditures from private to public goods 
will trigger pro-environment composition and technique effects which may overcome the scale 
effect thus improving environmental quality as measured by a decrease in production pollution, 
ceteris paribus.
4 We empirically test this hypothesis and find that, in general, increasing the 
government share of public goods improves both air and water quality indicators. Specifically, 
there are improvements in sulfur dioxide and lead, for air pollutants, and dissolved oxygen and 
biological oxygen demand for water pollutants. Since increasing the share of public goods has 
been demonstrated to also promote economic growth (López and Islam, 2008), such a 
                                                 
3 Moreover, López and Islam, (2008) showed that such a reallocation of government expenditures is not  caused by 
higher income growth; the causality is one way from the structure of public expenditures to growth and not the other 
way around. 
4 It must be noted that we focus our analysis on production pollution only and not consumption pollution. The 
mechanisms by which government expenditure size and composition affect consumption pollution is likely to differ 
compared to production pollution.   5
reallocation from private to public goods is win-win – good for the environment and good for 
growth.  
The study of the determinants of pollution has been closely linked to the environmental Kuznets 
curve. These studies examine a reduced form inverted u-shaped relationship between pollution 
and per capita income (Grossman and Krueger, 1993). Some extensions involve explicitly 
considering the role of political and institutional variables in affecting such a relationship (Barret 
and Graddy, 2000).  More recent studies have called into question both the accuracy of the 
datasets used, the methods of estimation and the robustness of the findings in this literature to 
changes in specifications (Harbaugh et al. 2002, Deacon and Norman 2004).  
Despite the number of studies that have used a variety of specifications to derive the 
determinants of pollution, we know of only one study that focuses on the role of fiscal policies 
play on pollution. Bernauer and Koubi (2006) examine the impact of government expenditures 
on sulfur dioxide (SO2) only. They find that increasing the level of total government 
expenditures increases SO2 concentrations. They only consider the impact of aggregated 
government expenditures ignoring the potentially vital issue of the structure or composition of 
government expenditures.  
To the best of our knowledge the present study is the first to consider the composition of 
government expenditures on environmental quality using a comprehensive set of air and water 
quality indicators. The ensuing econometric results consistently show that the composition of 
public expenditures is important in determining air and water quality. Transferring expenditures 
from private to public goods can be an effective instrument to improve environmental quality as 
opposed to increasing total public expenditure alone.    6
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 formulates the theoretical and 
empirical model. Section 3 describes the data used in the paper. Section 4 summarizes the results 
of the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes the study. 
2. Model 
2.1 Theoretical Model 
The model considers three sectors: one that produces an environmentally clean final good, yc, the 
other a dirty final good, yd, and the third sector produces an intermediate good called human 
capital or knowledge, h. Human capital is an input in the production of all three sectors. 
Development of human capital augments labor efficiency measured by hli where li is labor in the 
i
th sector. Firms also use inputs from government expenditure. The government uses its revenues 
in spending in productive inputs, g, and the rest is spent on excessive bureaucracy as well as in 
other forms of inefficient subsidies and waste, x.  
To capture the fact that dirty industries are generally more capital intensive than clean industries, 
we make the assumption that the clean sector’s production uses only knowledge, labor, lc, and 
the productive government input such that the production function is: 
( 1 )        cc y Ahl g
Ω =  
where A is a productivity index and Ω is the input elasticity of productive government inputs on 
clean good. We assume that 0 < Ω < 1 and clean final good is homogeneous of degree one in 
efficient labor, hlc. 
The dirty sector utilizes quasi-fixed physical capital, k, labor, ld, knowledge, dirty input creating 
production pollution, Z, productive government input, g, and government subsidy, x such that the 
production function is represented as follows: 
( 2 )       
1  () ( ) dd yD h l Z x k g
αβ α βη −− =+    7
 
where D is a productivity index, α is the input elasticity of efficient labor, β is the input elasticity 
of dirty inputs, η is the input elasticity of productive government inputs in producing the dirty 
good and 1-α-β is the input elasticity of capital. Note that we assume perfect substitution 
between physical capital and government subsidies. Production of the dirty good is homogenous 
of degree one in the private inputs ( , , d kh l Z). We assume that α>0, β>0, η>0 and α + β < 1.  
 Production of human capital uses labor, lr, and knowledge and a government-provided input 
such that the production function can be presented as follows: 
(3)                            () r hB h l g
εμ = , 
 
where ε, μ, and B are positive parameters. Equation (3) can be rewritten as: 
 
(3')                                                  
1
1- 1- 1-    r hB l g
ε μ
ε εε =  
 
We make the assumption that ε=1/2 for the sake of reducing algebraic clutter. This assumption is 
also convenient because it does not alter the qualitative results and yields a production function 
for h which is linearly homogenous in private inputs. Equation (3') can be re-written as, 
(3'')                                                      r hB l g
μ =  
 
where  
2 BB ≡ , and μ 2μ ≡ . Thus B can be interpreted as a productivity index, and μ is the input 
elasticity of the government-provided inputs in producing human capital. We assume that 0 < μ 
<1. We also assume that the productivity index in the human capital sector is larger than the 
clean good sector or dirty good sector such that B > A and B > D. 
The labor market clearing condition implies: 
 
(4)                        cdr Llll = ++ 
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Where  L is the total supply of labor in the economy which is assumed to be fixed, and is 
normalized to 1.  
Assumptions: 
(i) Government-provided input. The model assumes that the government-provided productive 
input affects all sectors of the economy though its productivity differs across sectors. 
Governments provide a variety of inputs, some public goods and others that target individual 
sectors. Given the public good component of many government inputs, it is very difficult to 
allocate them across sectors. In fact, many government inputs such as institutions, infrastructure, 
health care and others tend to have broad productive effects on many sectors at the same time. 
For this reason we use one aggregate measure of government input which has different impacts 
on each sector.  
A large portion of the productive government spending comprises expenditures in education, 
R&D, technological diffusion and health care. The clean final good sector and intermediate 
human capital sector are mainly comprised of services and high technology industries, which are 
dependent on communication infrastructure, development and enforcement of property right 
institutions and incentives provided to R&D. By contrast, the dirty sector is less dependent on 
public goods, property right institutions and other government inputs than the clean sector and 
the human capital production sector. For this reason we expect that the elasticity of g in the 
production of knowledge and clean good is larger than the dirty good. Since we assume that the 
elasticity effective labor in the clean sector is equal to one, we constrain the elasticity of 
government-provided input for clean goods and human capital to be equal such that μ= Ω (see 
Appendix 1). Therefore, we assume: μ= Ω> η.   9
(ii) Labor intensities. We assume that efficient labor, hli, has a larger effect on the output of the 
dirty sector than government inputs: α > η. This assumption is consistent with the assumptions of 
μ<1, and Ω<1 in the other sectors, which imply that efficient labor also has a higher production 
elasticity than the government-provided input in these sectors. Given the use of human capital in 
the production of dirty goods, we also find the α = η/μ which also implies that Ωα-η=0 since μ= 
Ω (see Appendix 1). 
Competitive equilibrium 
Producers in the dirty sector minimize cost of production by choosing labor and the dirty input, 
given g, x and k. 
(5)  ()
1- -
, ( , , , , , ) min :            ( )
d
dd d d lZ C w r k x g y whl Z D hl Z x k g y
αβ αβ η ττ += + + = , 
                                                         
where τ is the unit tax rate on pollution and r is the rental rate of capital.  Thus, we have the 
following first order conditions: 
 (6)             ()
1- - 1 () d Dh l Z xk g
αβ αβ η τλ β
− =+  
( 7 )            ()
1- - 1 () d wD h h l Z x k g
αβ α βη λα
− =+  
( 8 )            ()
1- -  () dd y Dh l Z x k g
αβ α βη =+  
where λ is the marginal cost of production of dirty output. Solving for Z and hld and substituting 
into the objective function yields the cost function (see Appendix 2), 
( 9 )            ()
11 1
 D( / ) ( 1/ ) d Cy x k g w
β ηα β αβ
α βα β α β α β α β α β αβ αβ βα τ
+− −−
+ ++ + + + + =+ + . 
Using Shepherd’s Lemma, we derive the input demand for dirty inputs, 




Zyx k g w
η αα αβ
α βα β α β α β αβ φτ
τ
+− −−
+ ++ + + ∂
== +
∂
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where 
1
=D ( / )
α
α βα β φα β
−−
++ . Here, the direct effects of output and wage rates increases the 
demand for Z while the direct effect of pollution tax, government expenditure and capital 
decreases Z. 
Logarithmic differentiation of (10) with respect to g yields, 
(11)          
ln ln ln 1 ln
 




α βα β α βα β
∂ ∂∂ ∂
=+− −
∂+ ∂ + ∂ + ∂ +
. 
Government expenditure affects the use of dirty inputs through four channels: the direct effect of 
government expenditure on Z and the indirect effects through wage, output in the dirty industry 
and pollution tax. To determine the total effect of government expenditure on Z in the general 
equilibrium model, we derive the impact of g on w in the labor market, the impact of g on yd 
using the production possibility frontier and isorevenue line of the economy and the impact of g 
on τ in the pollution market. 
The wage rate can be expressed as the marginal value product of labor in the clean sector: 
(12)                                wA h g
Ω =  
All three sectors compete for labor. Assuming perfect competition, the marginal value products 
of all three sectors equalize.  Equating the marginal products of labor in the clean and knowledge 
sectors gives us the following: 
(13)                     Ahg Bg
μ Ω =  
Since μ= Ω, we derive a unique equilibrium level of h and w consistent with competitive labor 
markets: 





=  and 
(15)                 
* wB g
Ω =  .   11
Because provision of productive government inputs yields the same percentage change in human 
capital and clean output, the equilibrium human capital level will only depend on the 
productivity ratios in both sectors. Since we assume B>A, human capital production ensures 
labor productivity augmentation. Equilibrium wage rate is increasing in government spending 
since it increases marginal productivity of labor. Thus, logarithmic differentiation of (15) with 
respect to g yields, 









Government expenditures can also affect output in the dirty sector. We use the production 
possibility frontier and the isorevenue function to derive the optimal level of dirty output, yd. To 
derive the production possibility frontier, we solve for efficient labor of each sector by 
substituting (14) into (1), (2) and (3'') and then substituting labor in each sector into the labor 
constraint (4). We obtain the following production possibility formulation, 
(17)          
11 1
-1 1  A( / ) ( ) cd Lg y B g y D A B Z x kg
β βα η
μ α αα α α
+−
− −− −− − Ω =+ + + . 
The corresponding isorevenue equation is, 
(18)           + dc TR py y =  
where TR is total revenue in the economy and p is output price ratio of the dirty good relative to 
the clean good. To derive the optimal level of output in the dirty sector, we equate the marginal 
rate of transformation from the production possibility frontier to the output price ratio from the 









. Using the implicit function theorem on (17), we arrive at 
the following condition,   12
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Using (19), we solve for yd, 
(20)          
11
11 1 11 1 1  () d yp D A Z x k g
α αα β β α η α
α ααα α α α α
− −− Ω
−
−− − −− − − =+ . 
Logarithmic differentiation of (20) with respect to g and using the condition  0 η α −Ω = yields, 











The impact of g on output in the dirty sector will depend on the effect of g on demand for dirty 
inputs. 
Increasing government productive expenditures may also affect the pollution tax rate. We 
assume that the government uses a virtual optimal pollution tax as a reference in setting the 
actual tax. Depending on institutional and social conditions the government may be able to 
choose a level of τ below the optimal tax rate, τ*. We first examine how g may affect the optimal 
pollution tax. 
The optimal tax rate is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between income and pollution 
(López, 1994). 





where u is the utility from consumption, c, and v(Z) is the disutility from pollution. We assume 
v’(Z) is positive and linear in Z such that v’(Z)≡γ.
5 Also, u is increasing and strictly concave, 
u’(c)>0, u’’(c)<0 where we assume the functional form u=ln(c). Total consumption is equal to 
total income which can be defined as total factor returns. Thus, c=(1-t)(wL+rk), where t is the 
                                                 
5 If  () vZ is strictly convex instead of linear, the ensuing results are reinforced.   13
income tax rate and total labor, L, is normalized to 1. Given our assumptions, the resulting 
pollution tax rate is equal to, 
( 2 3 )                
* τ (1 )( ) twr k γ =− +. 
Logarithmic differentiation of (23) with respect to g yields,  
(24)     









Since the impact of g on w is constant from (16), we find that τ* is increasing in g.  Here, an 
increase in g raises income of consumers. In turn, demand for pollution regulation increases 
resulting in higher levels of pollution taxes. 
The total impact of g on Z is derived by substituting (16), (21) and (24) into (11), 
(25)         





αμβ α γ μ η
α βαβ α αβ τ αβ
∂∂ − ⎛⎞ =+ − − ⎜⎟ ∂+ + − ∂ + + ⎝⎠
. 
We find that the direct effect of g along with the indirect effect through tax regulations and dirty 
output production is to decrease Z. On the other hand, an increase in g results in an increase in 
wage which decreases demand for labor in the dirty sector and results in a substitution towards Z. 
Solving for  ln / ln Z g ∂∂ , the total effect of increasing productive government expenditures, 
causes pollution to fall, ceteris paribus. 
(26)         







∂− − ⎛⎞ =− ⎜⎟ ∂− − ⎝⎠
. 
Lemma  1.  The total effect of increasing productive government expenditures is to lower 
pollution since the direct effect of productive government expenditure on demand for dirty inputs 
and the indirect effect through pollution taxes and output of dirty goods outweigh the indirect 
effect through wages, ceteris paribus. 
Productive expenditures and wasteful expenditures:   14
We now examine with more detail the connotation of increasing productive government 
expenditures on wasteful expenditures. Total revenues generated from taxation are spent by the 
government on productive inputs, g, and government waste, x: 




(28)      
() l nl n
   -1  
ln ln
dx w rk Z Z
t
dg g g g g
τ τ ⎛⎞ ∂+ ∂ ∂
=+ + + ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ⎝⎠
 
 
  An increase in productive government expenditures has a direct and indirect effect on 
government expenditures in wasteful activities, x. The direct effect is the reduction in wasteful 
activities x, as indicated by ‘-1’ in equation (27). If we assume total government expenditures are 
constant, then only the direct effect exists. However, increasing government expenditures in 
productive inputs may generate higher incomes and raise total government expenditures. Thus 
the second order effects may further increase government expenditures in productive inputs or in 
wasteful activities.  
Decomposing the Effect of Government Productive Inputs 
As in the case of the effects of trade policy analyzed by Antweiler, et al. (2001), the effect of 
changes in productive government inputs on production pollution can be decomposed into scale, 
composition, and technique effects. The indirect effect of productive government inputs through 
wages are representative of the scale effect since it relates to total income of the economy while 
the indirect effect through pollution tax regulations alter the composition of the economy. 
Technological innovation is measured as the change in pollution intensity per efficient labor. 
The Scale Effect 
Since productive government spending increases the total income of the economy (that is 
increases returns to labor and capital), we find total output value increasing including the output   15
of the dirty good. Thus, the increase in the scale of economic activity caused by higher levels of 
government spending may increase pollution. 
The Composition Effect 
To determine the composition effect, we derive the impact of g on output in the dirty and clean 
sector. Simplifying (21) using (26), we find the total effect of g on production of the dirty good, 








∂ − ⎛⎞ = < ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
. 
Thus, g  reduces dirty sector output.  
To determine the impact of g on yc, we derive output in the clean sector by substituting output in 
the dirty sector (20) into the production possibility frontier (17). We find, 
(29)          
1




Ω − =− + , 
where 
11 1




−− − − = . Differentiating the clean good production function above with 
respect to g results in:  
(30)          
1













Ω − ⎡⎤ ∂ ∂ ⎛⎞ = Ω− + > ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ∂− ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
. 
Since we derived  ln / ln 0 Zg ∂∂ <  from (26), we find that an increase in g will expand output in 
the clean sector. Lemma 2 summarizes the above results.  
Lemma 2. An increase in g alters the composition of the economy towards the clean final good 
sectors and away from the dirty sector, thus the composition effect of the economy is pollution 
decreasing. 
The Technique Effect 
The technique effect refers to the emission intensity per unit of dirty output in the economy. The 
effect of g on the dirty input-to-output ratio is,   16
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Using (26) and (21’), we simplify (31) as, 
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We find that an increase in g decreases dirty input use as well as output in the dirty sector. 
Because the elasticity of dirty input to output is less than 1, the decline in dirty input is larger 
than dirty output with an increase in g. Thus, the technique effect decreases pollution levels. 
Lemma 3. Increasing productive government expenditure reduces emissions intensity thus 
resulting in lower pollution levels through the technique effect.  
Combining Lemma 1 through 3 leads to the following the central hypothesis. 
The Central Hypothesis: An exogenous reallocation of government expenditures towards 
productive instead of wasteful activities reduces production pollution via the composition and 
technique effects.   
2.2 Empirical Model  
We estimate the effect of government expenditure composition on pollution levels by specifying 
an empirical model that controls various macroeconomic policies as well as proxy measures for 
the scale effect and technique effect. To derive the empirical model of estimation, we simplify 
and substitute for various variables in the demand for dirty inputs (10).  
First, the actual pollution tax rate τ may deviate from the optimal tax rate τ* due to political 
economy factors, P, or the growth rate of GDP, R.  More transparent governments are likely to 
institute pollution regulations close to τ*. Also, we hypothesize that the growth rate of GDP may 
have an impact on the ability of regulations to adjust to pollution levels. Countries that grow too   17
fast may not be able to adjust environmental regulations that control pollution levels. We assume 
that 
* (,) aPR τ τ = , where 01 a <≤  is a constant. Next, we assume that the productivity index in 
the dirty sector is a function of trade policies (T) such that D=D(T). More open economies may 
adopt more efficient technologies in the dirty sector. Lastly, output prices are dependent on total 
GDP, Y, such that p=p(Y). 
Substituting (20) into (10) along with our assumptions for D, τ, and p, we derive, 
(32)   ()
11 1 1
11 1 1 1  () () (,) ZD T p Y x k ga P R c
η αα α
α βα β α β α β α β ω
−Ω − −
−−
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−− −−  
where G is total government expenditure we can re-write (32) as, 
(32’)  ()
11 1 1
11 1 1 1 1 D(T) ( ) ( , ) Zp Y x k s G a P R c
η αη α α α
α βα β α β α β α β α β ϖ
−Ω −Ω − −
−−
−− −− −− −− −− −− =+ , 
where s≡g/G is the share of public goods expenditure in total government expenditure. Assuming 
Cobb-Douglas functions for D, τ, and p and taking logs, we postulate the following empirical 
relationship: 
 (33)  1 2 345 6 7 8 ln ln ln ict ct ct ct ct ct ct ct ct i t it ZsP T Y G R k c γ γγ γ γγγγχ ζ ϑ =++ + + + +++ + + ,    
where subscript i represents site, c represents country, and t represents time. Thus Zict is pollution 
concentration measured from site i in country c at year t;  ct s  is the share of public goods 
expenditure in total government expenditure; Rct is GDP growth rate; cct is household income per 
capita; Yct is total GDP per land area; Gct is government consumption expenditure over GDP; Tct 
is an index of trade policy openness; kct is a the share of investment over GDP; Pct is a political 
economy variable; χi  is a country effect, ζt is the time effect, ϑit is a random disturbance with the 
usual desirable properties, and γj (j=1,..,8)are parameters.        18
Several important comments regarding (33) are in order. We use annual dummies, ζt, to capture 
international shocks that may have a common effect on all countries in the sample such as world 
financial crises and international interest rates. The variable χi controls omitted variables as site-
fixed or random effects such as climate, land quality and institutions that may affect pollution.  
We use household income per capita, c, and total GDP per land area, Y, as proxy measures for 
the technique effect and scale effect, respectively. This implies that the effect of the composition 
of government expenditure takes into consideration the composition effect since we do not 
control for it given data limitations.  
3. The Data  
Water and air quality measures are derived from the Global Environmental Monitoring System 
(GEMS) dataset which has been the most consistent data source for cross-country pollution.
6 The 
air quality measures are currently compiled by the WHO Automated Meteorological Information 
System (AMIS) program. In this study, we use only the WHO-AMIS updated dataset from 1986 
– 1999. We use site level air pollutant concentrations measures for sulfur dioxide (SO2) and lead 
since they are main production pollutants from the energy sector and steel and iron 
manufacturing sector, respectively.
7 Taking SO2  as an example, there are about 2156 
observations distributed in 120 cities with about 2.5 measurement sites per city per year on 
average.
  The total number of countries included in the sample is 38 of which 19 are low and 
middle income and 19 are considered developed according to the World Bank classification.  
                                                 
6 The air quality database is sponsored by the World Health Organization (WHO) and maintained by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) while the water quality database is maintained by GEMSWater. The 
original air quality dataset utilized by Grossman and Krueger (1995) has been updated to GEMS/AIRS resulting in 
two GEMS datasets which were cleaned and combined by Harbaugh et al. (2002) for the years 1971 to 1992. 
However, in their study they do not explicitly explain how they combine the data when both datasets have differing 
observations.  
7 The National Ambient Air Quality Standard lists six common air pollutants: sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, lead, 
ozone, particulate matter and carbon monoxide (EPA, 2007a). Nitrogen dioxide, ozone, particulate matter and 
carbon monoxide are more likely to be consumption pollutants since they arise  from the use of transportation 
vehicles. Thus, we use only sulfur dioxide and lead.   19
We use data from GEMS-water for the period 1980-2005 for two water quality measures: 
dissolved oxygen (DO) and biological oxygen demand (BOD). Dissolved oxygen refers to 
oxygen freely available in water, vital to fish and other aquatic life and for the prevention of 
odors. Thus, high DO content indicates better water quality. These data are actual measurement 
of water quality from various groundwater, wetland, rivers or lakes in fixed sites.  Using 
dissolved oxygen as an example, there are 5020 observations per pollutant distributed in 702 
sites. The countries are listed in the appendix.  
Government expenditures data is obtained from the Government Financial Statistics database 
compiled by the IMF and, in some cases, we used data from the Asian Development Bank. 
Public goods expenditures include expenditures in education, health, social protection, transport, 
communications, public order and safety, research and development, environment, recreation and 
culture, and social housing. Table A1 in the appendix presents summary statistics of the data. 
Data source and descriptions are in Table A2 in the appendix. 
4. Results 
We present Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects, Random Effects and Hausman Taylor 
Random Effects (HTRE) estimates of air and water quality indicators based on the specification 
in (33).
8 Fixed Effects and Random Effects models take into consideration the heterogeneous 
characteristics across countries. The underlying assumption in the Fixed Effects model allows 
endogeneity in all regressors and individual effects while in the Random Effects Model 
exogeneity is assumed. Alternatively, we relax the all or nothing choice of endogeneity with 
regressors by estimating a Hausman Taylor Random Effects (HTRE) model that assumes some 
                                                 
8 Several variations of Fixed Effects and Random Effects were estimated including with and without year effects, 
with and without site characteristics, and with and without political variables.  We also estimate One Way Fixed 
Effects. Results are available upon request.   20
of the regressors are correlated with the individual effects in the air and water pollutants 
regressions. We also probe the robustness of our coefficients using different specifications.
9  
The first two columns of Tables 1 through 4 present the coefficient estimates of the determinants 
of different air pollutants. The goodness-of-fit of the model is satisfactory as shown by the 
adjusted R-squared and significant coefficients. We correct for any potential autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity by estimating the standard errors of the coefficients using the Huber / White / 
Sandwich estimator of variance. The Hausman tests rejects the assumption that all regressors are 
endogenous indicating that Fixed Effects are preferred over Random Effects. However, the 
Hausman test is in favor of HTRE.   
We find a negative and significant effect for the share of public goods on SO2 and lead 
concentrations in all specifications. When we take into consideration heterogeneous 
characteristics across countries, the impact of the share of public goods expenditures in reducing 
lead concentrations are larger than SO2 concentrations. The estimates from the HTRE model 
suggest an elasticity of share of public goods expenditure on pollution in the magnitude of -0.396 
and -0.720 for SO2 and lead, respectively. This implies a 10% reallocation of expenditures from 
private subsidies to public goods expenditure holding total public expenditure constant, would 
result in a 4% decrease in SO2 concentration and 7% decrease in lead concentrations. In contrast, 
the share of overall government consumption expenditure relative to Gross Domestic Product is 
smaller and less significant.  
The last two columns of Tables 1 through 4 present the results for water quality and water 
pollutants. For dissolved oxygen (DO) and Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD), the share of 
government expenditures in public goods is significant and reduces (increases) water pollution 
                                                 
9 The results presented in tables 1 through 5 do not change with inclusion of Tax over GDP, and Foreign Direct 
Investment.   21
(quality) in all estimations apart from TWFE where the sign is correct but insignificant.  Using 
estimate from HTRE, a 10% reallocation of expenditures from private subsidies to public goods 
expenditure holding total public expenditure constant, would result in a 0.2% increase in water 
quality as measured by dissolved oxygen concentration and a 1% decrease in BOD. 
Using the estimates from HTRE, we performed a simulation of the effect of changes in the share 
of public goods on the air and water quality measures. Increasing the share of public goods by 
one standard deviation (about 27% of the sample mean) reduces SO2 concentrations by 8% of its 
standard deviation (11% of the sample mean), lead by 12% of its standard deviation (or 20% of 
the sample mean), and BOD concentration by 1% of its standard deviation  (or 4% of the sample 
mean) while increasing dissolved oxygen level by about 2% of its standard deviation (or 0.5% of 
the sample mean) .  
The size of the government, as measured by the share of government consumption expenditure in 
GDP, consistently significantly decreases SO2 and lead while increasing water quality as 
measured by DO. This particular result lends some support to theories that governments do 
provide public goods and correct for externalities instead of adding to market inefficiencies 
through added bureaucracy and policy distortions. Our results are also in contrast with the 
empirical findings of Bernauer and Koubi (2006) where they find an increase in government 
spending by 1% leads to a 1.70% to 2.88% increase in SO2 concentrations. We find that 
increasing government expenditure by 1% leads to a reduction in SO2 emissions from 0.38% to 
0.48%. The differences in sign is likely due to the lack of control of heterogeneous country 
characteristics which biases coefficient estimates since Bernauer and Koubi use regular OLS in 
their panel estimation.    22
We are able to measure the technique effect, output scale effect and growth rate effects on 
pollution levels. Per capita household income has a significant and negative effect for SO2 and 
significant and positive effect for DO for all specifications. We derive relatively inelastic income 
elasticities that range from -0.126 to -0.811 for SO2. These estimates are lower than those 
derived by Antweiler et al. (2001) where they derive estimates between -0.9 to -1.5 for SO2. To 
the extent that government expenditures are positively correlated with household income, the 
omission of the former in the regression could bias estimates upward in magnitude which could 
explain the disparity in coefficient estimates between the two models. The output scale effect, as 
proxied by GDP per land area, is positive and significant for SO2 and BOD and negative and 
significant for DO in all estimations. Lastly, the growth rate effect is consistently positive and 
significant for lead and to a lesser extent, SO2, as we hypothesized.  
We can use the coefficients relating to the scale and technique effect to investigate the impact of 
growth on pollution. The scale and technique effects are not implausibly high. If we assume a 
1% technologically neutral growth in the economy that does not change economic composition, 
this would raise GDP in the economy by 1%. Based on estimates from Table 4 for SO2, the scale 
effect dominates the technique effect. However, reallocation towards public goods expenditure 
could help counteract the scale effect on pollution levels because it changes the composition of 
the economy away from production of dirty goods to clean goods. A reallocation towards public 
goods expenditure which alters economic composition along with the technique effect 
counteracts the scale effect on pollution leading to an increase in environmental quality.  
The political economy variables generally have a negative effect on pollution when significant. 
This result is consistent with the notion that political economy factors are important in 
determining the emergence of institutions that regulate pollution levels. Particularities of the   23
political system, the degree of participation of the civil society in monitoring governments (Li et 
al, 1998, White and Anderson, 2001, Lundberg and Squire, 2003, Dollar and Kray, 2002), 
freedom of the press (Chong and  Grandstein, 2004, Arimah, 2004) are some of the politico-
economy factors that appear to play a role in improving social welfare and subsequently 
improving environmental quality. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper presents the first attempt at highlighting the importance of the composition of public 
goods expenditure in determining the air and water quality. Reallocating government expenditure 
towards the provision of public goods and correction of externalities while reducing private 
subsidies could improve environmental quality. An increase in the share of public goods in total 
government expenditure decreases significantly the concentration of lead and SO2 in the 
atmosphere while improving water quality as measured by DO and decreasing BOD 
concentrations.  Policies that induce economic growth can lead to a decrease in pollution 
emissions as long as the scale effect is offset by the technique effect and composition effect. 
Policies that promote stable political regimes also improve environmental quality. 
One interesting avenue for future research is to extend the model to other pollutants. A 
possibility may occur where institution of stringent regulations on a particular pollutant will lead 
to a substitution away from the regulated pollutant to an unregulated pollutant. Regulation-
induced pollution substitution in particular industries and how the composition of government 
expenditure mitigates these emissions to the environment is an important study area to 
investigate. Also, we focused our theoretical and empirical analysis on production pollutants. It 
would be interesting to extend the model to examine how consumption pollutants are affected by 
the size and composition of public expenditure.   24
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Table 1. Determinants of Air and Water Pollutants using OLS. Dependent Variables are in Logs  
 













-1.342*** -1.236*** 0.095***  -0.247*** 
 
Log Share of public goods (as %  of total 
govt exp)  [0.094] [0.206] [0.022] [0.040] 
      
0.200* -1.244***  0.130***  -0.281***  Log Share of government cons exp over 
GDP – Penn Tables                                     [0.118] [0.245] [0.027] [0.101] 
      
 
0.178*** 0.316*** 0.038*** -0.053* 
Log of Household final consumption 
expenditure                  
    per capita  (2000 US$) average of 
current and previous two years       [0.032] [0.065] [0.014] [0.032] 
      
0.190***  -0.217*** -0.020*** 0.284***  Log of Total GDP (2000 US$) over  land 
area (sq. km)  [0.020] [0.036] [0.004] [0.015] 
      
-0.517 5.901***  -0.102 -0.828*  Growth rate of GDP  
[0.695] [1.279] [0.198] [0.502] 
      
-0.003*** -0.003  -0.0018***  0.007***  Trade – Asati Index 
[0.001] [0.002] [0.0002]  [0.001] 
      
0.056 -1.125***  0.111***  -0.456***  Log of Share of Investment over  GDP 
[0.099] [0.166] [0.020] [0.055] 
      
-0.645*** 0.083  0.038*  0.120**  Dummy Freedom of Press 
[0.066] [0.150] [0.021] [0.055] 
      
-0.083*** -0.033**  0.006***  0.003  Polity 2 
[0.007] [0.014] [0.002] [0.005] 
      
-0.061*** -0.111*** 0.011***  -0.124***  Years of Democratic Stability 
[0.007] [0.016] [0.002] [0.005] 
      
0.218 1.393***  -0.232  0.016  Socialist Dummy 1986-1992 
[0.282] [0.188] [0.276] [0.130] 
      
-0.361*** -0.767*** 0.078  0.103  Former Socialist Dummy 
[0.106] [0.201] [0.179] [0.097] 
      
0.109** 0.216*      City Center Dummy 
[0.052] [0.120]    
      
0.080* 0.142      Other Urban Dummy 
[0.048] [0.104]    
        27
0.305*** 1.847***     Traffic Dummy 
[0.083] [0.136]    
      
-0.971*** -1.175***     Rural Dummy 
[0.081] [0.159]    
      
  -0.347***  -0.852***  Dummy for Groundwater 
    [0.051]  [0.145] 
      
  0.231***  -0.455***  Dummy for Lake 
  [0.041]  [0.149] 
      
  0.092**  -0.13  Dummy for River 
  [0.037]  [0.137] 
      
  -0.145***  0.198***  Water Temperature 
  [0.034]  [0.056] 
      
0.014 -6.083***  2.662***  -3.658***  Constant 
[0.374] [0.642] [0.160] [0.327] 
      
Observations  2057 688  4799 3810 
Adjusted R-squared  0.44 0.3  0.34 0.44 
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Table 2: Determinants of Air and Water Pollutants Using Two Way Fixed Effects (TWFE) 
with Political Economy Controls. Dependent Variables are in Logs. 
 















-0.363***  -0.605*** 0.012  -0.126*** 
 
Log Share of public goods (as  
%  of total govt exp)  [0.078] [0.131] [0.013] [0.034] 
      
-0.380* -1.010* 0.096  0.531**  Log Share of government cons exp over 
GDP – Penn  Tables  [0.209] [0.520] [0.066] [0.211] 
      
-0.811** 1.523*  0.280*** -0.299  Log of Household final consumption          
expenditure  per capita  (2000 US$) 
average of current and previous two years    [0.333] [0.801] [0.086] [0.198] 
      
1.006*** 0.831  -0.206***  0.502***  Log of Total GDP (2000 US$)                    
over  land area (sq. km)  [0.268] [0.595] [0.070] [0.150] 
      
0.227 1.843**  0.119 -0.178  Growth rate of GDP  
[0.410] [0.818] [0.125] [0.338] 
      
-0.001 0.009**  0.0003 0.005***  Trade – Asati Index 
[0.001] [0.004] [0.0006]  [0.002] 
      
0.285*** -0.036  0.034  -0.456***  Log of Share of Investment over GDP  
[0.110] [0.236] [0.036] [0.091] 
      
-0.142*** -0.158  0.0005  0.118***  Dummy Freedom of Press 
[0.041] [0.099] [0.0163]  [0.041] 
      
-0.011 -0.075***  -0.0001  0.0005  Polity 2 
[0.011] [0.017] [0.0014]  [0.0057] 
      
-0.005 0.142***  -0.01  -0.147***  Years of Democratic Stability 
[0.037] [0.053] [0.007] [0.031] 
      
-0.271**  -0.369 -0.048 0.014  Socialist Dummy 1986-1992 
[0.110] [0.241] [0.032] [0.076] 
      
  -0.017  -0.046  Water Temperature 
  [0.019]  [0.040] 
      
Observations  2057 688  4799 3810 
Adjusted R-squared  0.28 0.69 0.01 0.1 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Estimates include constant and year dummies not shown.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   29
Table 3: Determinants of Air and Water Pollutants Using Random Effects with Site 
Characteristics and Political Controls. Dependent Variables are in Logs. 
 












-0.421*** -0.879*** 0.025*  -0.137*** 
 
Log Share of public goods (as  
%  of total govt exp)  [0.061] [0.136] [0.013] [0.029] 
      
-0.483*** -0.790*** 0.122***  0.162  Log Share of government cons                    
exp over GDP – Penn  Tables  [0.168] [0.302] [0.039] [0.147] 
      
 
-0.126** 0.288*** 0.128*** -0.102** 
Log of Household final consumption   
expenditure  per capita  (2000 US$) 
average of current and previous two years    [0.055] [0.104] [0.019] [0.047] 
      
0.189*** -0.083  -0.044***  0.308***  Log of Total GDP (2000  
US$) over land area (sq. km)  [0.041] [0.060] [0.008] [0.033] 
      
0.823** 2.732***  0.061  -0.287  Growth rate of GDP  
[0.350] [0.735] [0.113] [0.322] 
      
0.0005 0.001  -0.001***  0.007***  Trade – Asati Index 
[0.0012]  [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] 
      
0.162* -0.431**  0.122***  0.162  Log of Share of Investment over GDP 
[0.096] [0.182] [0.039] [0.147] 
      
-0.254*** -0.207**  0.021  0.081**  Dummy Freedom of Press 
[0.041] [0.090] [0.015] [0.037] 
      
-0.025*** -0.056*** 0.001  0.002  Polity 2 
[0.008] [0.013] [0.002] [0.005] 
      
-0.064*** -0.082*** 0.001  -0.112***  Years of Democratic Stability 
[0.012] [0.024] [0.004] [0.011] 
      
0.057 0.286     City Center Dummy 
[0.105] [0.234]    
      
-0.041 0.348      Other Urban Dummy 
[0.121] [0.221]    
      
0.453** 1.519***      Traffic Dummy 
[0.218] [0.240]    
      
-0.713*** -0.573**      Rural Dummy 
[0.158] [0.248]    
        30
  -0.439*  -0.605  Dummy for Groundwater 
    [0.229] [0.719] 
      
  0.122  -0.318  Dummy for Lake 
  [0.211]  [0.719] 
      
  0.036  0.039  Dummy for River 
  [0.208]  [0.697] 
      
  -0.027  -0.015  Water Temperature 
  [0.019]  [0.036] 
      
Observations  2057 688  4799 3810 
No. of Sites  298 126 692 503 
Hausman Test (P-value)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Overall R-squared  0.42 0.30 0.29 0.44 
Robust Standard errors in brackets. Estimation includes constant, year, socialist and former socialist dummies not 
shown. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   31
Table 4: Determinants of Air and Water Pollutants Using Hausman Taylor Random 
Effects with Site Characteristics and Political Controls. Dependent Variables are in Logs. 
 












-0.396*** -0.720*** 0.019*  -0.135*** 
 
Log Share of public goods (as  
%  of total govt exp)  [0.073] [0.133] [0.012] [0.031] 
      
-0.381** -0.572*  0.097*  0.325**  Log Share of government cons                    
exp over GDP – Penn  Tables  [0.154] [0.313] [0.051] [0.153] 
      
 
-0.223** 0.990*** 0.135*** -0.073 
Log of Household final consumption   
expenditure  per capita  (2000 US$) 
average of current and previous two years    [0.093] [0.285] [0.024] [0.060] 
      
0.290*** 0.457**  -0.053***  0.329***  Log of Total GDP (2000  
US$) over land area (sq. km)  [0.077] [0.221] [0.017] [0.044] 
      
0.580* 1.767***  0.042  -0.174  Growth rate of GDP  
[0.334] [0.666] [0.106] [0.315] 
      
0.001 0.008**  -0.001*  0.006***  Trade – Asati Index 
[0.001] [0.003] [0.000] [0.001] 
      
0.355*** -0.024  0.023  -0.446***  Log of Share of Investment over  GDP 
[0.094] [0.188] [0.028] [0.079] 
      
-0.189*** -0.189**  0.019  0.089**  Dummy Freedom of Press 
[0.037] [0.079] [0.013] [0.037] 
      
-0.016* -0.077***  -0.0001 0.002  Polity 2 
[0.010] [0.015] [0.0017]  [0.005] 
      
-0.044** 0.045  -0.001  -0.129***  Years of Democratic Stability 
[0.022] [0.044] [0.005] [0.014] 
      
-0.064 -0.285     City Center Dummy 
[0.226] [0.866]    
      
-0.107 1.13      Other Urban Dummy 
[0.248] [0.939]    
      
0.293 0.093     Traffic Dummy 
[0.912] [2.845]    
      
-0.802 -2.671     Rural Dummy 
[1.600] [3.951]    
        32
  -0.481  -0.932  Dummy for Groundwater 
    [0.613] [1.161] 
      
  0.078  -0.641  Dummy for Lake 
  [0.612]  [1.160] 
      
  0.003  -0.267  Dummy for River 
  [0.607]  [1.141] 
      
  -0.019**  -0.033  Water Temperature 
  [0.008]  [0.021] 
      
Observations  2057 688  4799 3810 
No. of Sites  298 126 692 503 
Hausman Test (P-value)  1.0000 0.1621 0.9855 0.9999 
Robust Standard errors in brackets. Estimation includes constant, year, socialist and former socialist dummies not 
shown. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1. Relationship between various input elasticities in the model. 
 
•  The elasticity of government-provided input for clean goods and human capital to be equal, 
i.e. μ= Ω.  
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Ω≡  and 
dh g
dg h
μ ≡  we have  μ Ω = . 
•  The elasticity of human capital in dirty goods is equal to ratio of government-provided input 
for dirty goods and human capital, i.e. α = η/μ.  
We have  / 
d
d
dy gd h g
dg y dg h
ημ = . Rearranging, 
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ημ = . Thus, 
/ η μα = . 
Note that since  μ Ω=  and α = η/μ we obtain  0 α η Ω−=.   34
Appendix 2. Deriving Cost Function 
 











= . Substituting (A1) into (8) we derive: 
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Using (A2) and (A3) in the objective function we derive the following cost function,  
    ()
11 1
 D( / ) ( 1/ ) d Cy x k g w
β ηα β αβ
α βα β α β α β α β α β αβ αβ βα τ
+− −−
++ + + + + + =+ + .   35
Table A1: Summary Statistics of the Data Used in Regressions  
  Mean Std.  Dev  Min  Max 
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2)  39  53.1  0.2  774 
Lead 0.3  0.5  0.005  4.5 
Dissolved Oxygen  8.5  2.7  0.03  84.7 
Biological Oxygen Demand  4.3  19  0.01  604.0 
Household final consumption   
expenditure  per capita  (2000 
US$) moving average of 
current and previous two years   
5152 5247.2  111.2  22223.2 
GDP growth (2000 US$)     0.03  0.05  -0.32  0.15 
Share of public goods (as %   
of total govt exp) 
0.55 0.15 0.20 0.88 
GDP Per Square Km  1,268,455  2,108,234  11,954  12,200,000 
Share of Govt. Exp. over GDP  0.22  0.07  0.07  0.55 
Share of Investment over GDP  0.18  0.075  0.029  0.441 
 
 
Country List of Pollution Data Availability 
 
Countries with Air Pollution Data: 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Japan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, 
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay 
 
Countries with Water Pollution Data 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Iran, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, 
Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russia, Spain, Sweden, 
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Table A2. Description of Variables 
 
Variable Description  Years 
Available 
Source 
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2)  SO2 concentration, micrograms per cubic meter  1986-1999  GEMS  
Lead  Lead, micrograms per cubic meter  1986-1999  GEMS 
Biological Oxygen 
Demand 
Quantity of oxygen necessary for biological and 
chemical oxidation of water-borne substances in  
milligrams per liter. 
1980-2005 GEMSWater 
Dissolved Oxygen  Oxygen concentration in  milligrams per liter  1980-2005  GEMSWater 
Household final 
consumption  expenditure   
per capita  (2000 US$)       
(3 year moving aveage)            
Household final consumption expenditure 
(formerly private consumption) is the market 
value of all goods and services, including durable 
products (such as cars, washing machines, and 
home computers), purchased by households. It 
excludes purchases of dwellings but includes 
imputed rent for owner-occupied dwellings. It 
also includes payments and fees to governments 
to obtain permits and licenses. Here, household 
consumption expenditure includes the 
expenditures of nonprofit institutions serving 
households, even when reported separately by the 
country. 
 
1980 – 2004  World  Development  Indicators 
(World Bank) 
GDP growth (2000 US$)     Real GDP per Capita growth (Constant US$ 
2000) 
 
1980 – 2004  World  Development  Indicators 
(World Bank) 
Share of Govt. Exp. in 
Public Goods 
This is the share of government expenditure on 
public goods. Public goods are defined as a total 






vi) Public order and safety
vii) Housing and community amenities 
viii) Environmental Protection 
ix) Religion and Culture 
 
1980 – 2004  Government  Financial  Statistics 
(IMF), Asian Development Bank, 
Country data 
 
Level of government: 
Consolidated central government is 
the level of government used apart 
from: 
 
Budgetary: Bangladesh, Ecuador, 
Greece Jordan New Zealand, 
Philippines 
 
Consolidated General: India 
 
Trade Openness  Sati index which is the residual of the regression 
of Trade on population, area, gdp per capita, 
dummy for industrialized country, dummy for oil 
exporter, and imports over export prices. A 
positive residual implies a more open economy 
 
1980-2001  Pritchett, Lant. 1996. Updated by 
López and Galinato (2007) 
 
GDP Per Square Km  Total GDP (2000 US$) over land area  1980-2004 World  Development  Indicators 
(World Bank) 
Foreign Direct Investment 
over GDP 
Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of 
investment to acquire a lasting management 
interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an 
enterprise operating in an economy other than that 
of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, 
1980-2005 World  Development  Indicators 
(World Bank)   37
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, 
and short-term capital as shown in the balance of 
payments. This series shows net inflows in the 
reporting economy and is divided by GDP. 
Share of Govt. Exp. over 
GDP 
  1980 – 2004  Penn World Tables (2006)  
Share of Investment over 
GDP 
  1980 – 2004  Penn World Tables (2006) 
Polity Index  
(Polity 2) 
Score that indicates how democratic is a country  1980-2003  Polity IV 
www.cidcm.umd.edu 
Years of Democratic 
Stability 
Square root of Durability of Polity  if  Polity  2>0  1980-2005  From Polity IV and updated to 
2005 
www.cidcm.umd.edu 
Dummy Freedom of Press  1 if print media is considered free  1980-2005  www.freedomhouse.org 
 
 
 
 